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Abstract 
Credit spreads can be derived from the prices of securities traded in different markets. In this paper we 
investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bonds, credit default 
swaps, equities and equity options. Using a vector error correction model (VECM) of changes in credit 
spreads for a sample that includes the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we find that during periods of high 
volatility, price discovery takes place primarily in the option market, whilst the equity market leads the 
other markets during tranquil periods. By adding GARCH effects to the VECM specification, we also 
find strong evidence of volatility spillovers from the option market to the other markets in crisis periods. 
Finally, we show how time-varying measures of price discovery can be generated using GARCH models. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 was characterised by sharp changes in asset prices. Variations in 
credit spreads were an important contributing factor to asset price volatility. An extensive literature shows 
the impact of credit spreads on bond prices and recent research has started to single out and analyse a 
credit risk factor in stock prices (Vassolou and Xing, 2004). The increasing role of credit risk in 
securities’ prices has also led bank regulators to introduce new capital requirements that reflect the 
potential for credit risk related losses in traded instruments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009). In the light of recent events, it is important for financial economists, traders and regulators to 
identify the markets that incorporate credit risk related information most quickly and lead other markets 
in the price discovery process. Such information may give an early warning on imminent and possible 
large shocks in asset prices. In addition, an understanding of the transmission mechanism of credit risk 
information across markets and its evolution over time may shed light on the relative efficiency of the 
markets and on the way their role changes in different market conditions. In this paper we investigate the 
discovery of the price of credit risk in the bond, CDS, stock and option markets before and during the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. 
The credit risk associated with a company may be measured in the credit market, via the credit spread of 
bonds issued by that company and via the price of credit default swaps (CDS) written on those bonds. 
Indirectly, credit risk can also be quantified through implied credit spreads. For example, Kealhofer 
(2003a and b) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) show how information on credit risk can be extracted from 
equity prices. Hull et al. (2005), Stamicar and Finger (2006) and Cao et al. (2011), on the other hand, 
show how to use the price of options written on a firm’s stock to obtain implied credit spreads.  
Several papers look at price discovery in the bond and CDS markets (e.g. Blanco et al., 2005 and Zhu, 
2004) and bond, CDS and stock markets (Longstaff et al., 2003, Norden and Weber, 2009 and Forte and 
Peña, 2009). However, the role of the option market in the price discovery of credit risk has attracted less 
attention even though it could be substantial. Indeed, recent research has found that the implied volatility 
of options written on stocks or stock futures can help explain credit spreads (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, 
Cremers et al., 2008, Berndt and Ostrovnaya, 2008, Cao et al., 2010 and Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). 
This is not surprising as banks and hedge funds routinely implement arbitrage trading strategies (see 
JPMorgan, 2006) that are based on the discrepancies between the credit spreads implied from equity 
options and the spreads of bonds and CDS contracts for individual firms.1  
                                                          
1
 These strategies do not ensure riskless profits as the traditional meaning of arbitrage implies, hence they are referred to as “risky 
arbitrage”. 
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We add to the existing literature by (1) analysing, for the first time, all the markets that, according to 
previous studies, may contribute to the price discovery of credit risk, namely the bond, CDS, equity and 
option markets; (2) performing our analysis over a sample period that includes the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis which allows us to investigate changes in price discovery during tranquil and crisis periods; (3)  
investigating the presence and direction of volatility spillovers among the four markets; and (4)  
introducing a time-varying price discovery measure based on a conditional volatility model. Our main 
finding is that the option market contributes the most to price discovery during periods of high volatility, 
followed by the bond and CDS markets. Although not dominant, the option market is also important 
during tranquil periods, but it is the equity market that leads the others during such times. The CDS 
market has an important but not a leading role in price discovery in both stable and turbulent periods. 
Moreover, our results are corroborated by robust evidence of volatility spillovers from the option market 
to the other markets for most of the companies analysed.  
Our findings should be of interest to various market participants. Policymakers, concerned about the 
stability of the whole financial system, should benefit from a better understanding of how equities, bonds, 
options and credit derivatives are interlinked during periods of high and low volatility. Also, 
understanding which market contributes the most to price discovery and volatility spillovers becomes 
crucial to provide timely responses to systemic crises. Speculators, hedgers and arbitrageurs are also 
clearly interested in receiving the earliest possible signals to identify credit risk reversals.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature on credit risk 
price discovery. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and our methodology. In Section 5 and 6 we discuss 
the main results and robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
The literature on price discovery in credit spreads is relatively recent. Zhu (2004) analyses CDS and bond 
spreads and finds that CDSs lead price discovery in the US market, whilst in Europe and Asia it is the 
bond market which has a leading role. Another study on the relationship between the bond and CDS 
markets in Europe and the US is that of Blanco et al. (2005), and they conclude that the CDS market is 
responsible, on average, for about 80 percent of price discovery over their sample period. A more recent 
study from Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) finds that price discovery in the CDS market decreased during 
the financial crisis of 2008 in favour of the bond market for a sample of US companies.  
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Acharya and Johnson (2007) study the information flow between CDS and equity markets and find 
evidence of insider trading in the CDS market. They argue that insider trading could be a reason for the 
leading role of the CDS market against the equity market. However, this informational advantage is found 
only in the presence of negative credit news.   
Longstaff et al. (2003) are the first to analyse the lead-lag relations between bonds, CDSs as well as 
stocks. They find that the CDS and equity markets lead the bond market most of the time. However, 
based on a study using a VAR model, Norden and Weber (2009) find that the stock market is more likely 
to lead the other two markets and the CDS market appears to lead the bond market. However, when they 
employ a VECM specification for the CDS and bond markets, a leading role of the CDS market is found 
for US companies only, whereas both markets contribute the same amount to price discovery for 
European companies. The first study to analyse the three markets (CDS, bonds and equities) in a VECM 
framework is that of Forte and Peña (2009). They perform a price discovery analysis that is intuitively 
more appealing than in previous contributions as they compare homogeneous measures of credit risk in 
terms of observed or implied credit spreads obtained from the three markets. Their main finding is 
consistent with Norden and Weber (2009) in the sense that the stock market leads the price discovery 
process, followed by the CDS market.  
The literature on volatility spillovers between credit markets for individual companies is thin. Baba and 
Inada (2009) find evidence of volatility spillovers from the CDS to the bond market by analysing four 
Japanese banks’ subordinated CDS and bond spreads. Meng et al. (2009) extend the analysis to the equity 
market and find evidence of spillovers from equities to bonds and vice versa. On the other hand, the CDS 
market sends less volatility to the other two markets than it receives, and they conclude that all three 
markets are important and none of them is more efficient than the others.  
Early insights into the relevance of the option market, in particular of option implied volatilities, as 
determining factors of credit spreads, are given in the seminal paper of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). The 
study finds that changes in the slope of the “smirk” of implied volatilities of options on S&P500 futures is 
a statistically significant explanatory variable for the changes in bond credit spreads. Cao et al. (2010) 
find that the option-implied volatility of individual companies is important to explain single-name CDS 
spreads and becomes more significant for companies characterised by high volatility in CDS spreads, low 
credit rating and large option trading volume. Similar results are found by Cremers et al. (2008), who 
confirm the importance of option-implied volatilities in explaining levels of bond credit spreads. They 
also find that the volatility skew of individual companies is significant, in line with the results of Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001). Another interesting study is that of Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who use Markov 
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switching regressions to explain changes in European CDS indices in different regimes. Their main 
conclusion is that option-implied volatilities represent the main determinant of changes in CDS spreads in 
a volatile regime, whereas in stable conditions equity market returns have a predominant role.  
Lastly, Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) study how negative news is built into option prices, CDS spreads 
and stock prices. Based on Acharya and Johnson (2007) they employ a model which allows CDS and 
option market participants to have insider information and trade on this information in advance, before the 
public disclosure of future negative events. They conclude that the flow of information in the CDS and 
option market works both ways. But, prior to some adverse market news, such as accounting scandals, the 
option market carries superior information. Interestingly, using a similar methodology, Cao et al. (2010) 
find that option implied volatility innovations are more capable to predict future CDS spread changes than 
the other way around. However, both Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) and Cao et al. (2010) do not convert 
the information from different markets into common and comparable credit risk measures, that is, credit 
spreads. Hence, they don’t take into account the long run equilibrium relationship that may exist among 
the spreads implied from the different markets. Furthermore, they do not consider the bond market which 
may be an important source of information in the price discovery process. 
 
3. Data 
In our analysis we use daily observations of CDS mid-quotes, bond yields, equity prices and option 
implied volatilities for a sample of 12 European non-financial companies from January 2006 until July 
20092. Following Longstaff et al. (2003), starting from a much larger sample we retain only those 
companies for which at least 100 observations per year (55 observations in 2009 as our sample ends in 
July 2009) are simultaneously available, on the same dates, for all of the above securities. Having a high 
number of companies to analyse has always been a problem in the price discovery literature on credit 
spreads, mainly due to missing data. Our study is the first that considers four markets at the same time, 
which means that additional missing values further shorten the sample of dates available for the analysis 
and hence restrict the number of companies with sufficient observations across all the four markets. As a 
result, one should expect our sample to be somewhat more restricted than in previous studies.3  
A. CDS and Bond Data 
                                                          
2
 The series of spreads for some companies do not cover the whole sample period. In particular, time series for Renault are 
available from May 10, 2006, and For Telenor and Vodafone, credit spreads series are available until February 3, 2009 and May 
26, 2009, respectively. 
3
 Given our additional constraints, our sample of 12 companies is in line with sample sizes in previous studies: 17 in Forte and 
Peña (2009), 18 in Blanco et al. (2005) and 16 in Zhu (2006). 
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CDS bid and ask quotes for various maturities are obtained from GFI, a market leader in OTC credit 
derivatives trading. End-of-day quotes are compiled by GFI at 6pm London Time. We restrict our 
analysis to senior unsecured CDSs with 5 year maturity as they are the most liquid. For the same 
companies, we derive credit spreads from their outstanding corporate bonds. Following previous studies, 
we construct synthetic 5-year credit spreads for each company using yields for two bonds with the 
following characteristics: they are denominated in Euros4 and are senior unsecured; they have “generic” 
Bloomberg mid-market prices which are average quotes from at last five brokers or dealers; they are not 
floating-rate and do not have embedded options or any special features; one bond has a maturity below 5 
years while the other has a maturity above 5 years.5 Bond yields are downloaded from Bloomberg. From 
the same source we also obtain 5-year swap rates for Euros6 which we use as a proxy for the risk free rate 
as in previous studies (see Hull et al., 2005 and Houweling and Vorst, 2005). The reference time for the 
European bond data provided by Bloomberg is 7.20 pm London time. 
B. Equity and Option Data 
We employ the CreditGrades structural model to estimate the 5-year equity implied spreads. The model is 
widely used by both researchers and practitioners. Recent studies that have employed this model are 
Duarte et al. (2007) and Yu (2006). A summary of its main features is presented in Appendix A. In order 
to implement CreditGrades, we need the following inputs for each company: daily series of stock prices 
and market capitalizations; accounting data including short-term and long-term liabilities, minority 
interest, preferred shares; the mean global recovery rate L and its standard deviation λ; the recovery rate 
of the firm’s senior unsecured debt, R ; the annualized equity volatility Sσ
 
and the 5-year risk-free 
interest rate r . 
Stock prices, market capitalisations, accounting data and 5-year swap rates are downloaded from 
Bloomberg. The reference time for stock prices and market capitalisation varies according to the market 
close of the European exchange in which a company is listed.7 For L  and λ we take the estimated values 
of 0.5 and 0.3, respectively, reported in the CreditGrades Technical Document (2002), which are based on 
historical data of about 300 non-financial companies. The recovery rate R is estimated as the Moody’s 
average historical recovery rate on senior unsecured debt over the period 1982-2009 (see Moody’s 2011) 
                                                          
4
 In the case of Marks&Spencer, we only find bonds denominated in GBP, and we use these in our analysis. 
5
 For most of the companies, we calculate 5-year spreads via linear interpolation. However, for two companies (Lvmh and Upm) 
and for only a small part of the sample, we could not find bonds with maturity above 5 years so we had to resort to linear 
extrapolation.  
6
 In the case of Marks&Spencer we use 5-year swap rates in GBP in order to obtain the 5-year credit spreads. 
7
 The market close in London time for the main exchanges represented in our sample is 4.30 pm (London Stock Exchange), 7 pm 
(Frankfurt Stock Exchange), 4:30 pm (Euronext Paris Stock Exchange) and 6.20 pm (Oslo Stock Exchange). 
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and is equal to 0.326. To compute bond spreads, we use the 5-year swap rates for Euros as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate. To estimate the equity volatility Sσ  we follow the CreditGrades Technical Document 
(2002). However, while CreditGrades employs a 1,000-day moving average of past equity stock returns, 
we resort to a 40-day moving average to improve the volatility’s responsiveness to changing market 
conditions. This is consistent with the shorter time span (2 months) used to obtain option implied 
volatilities for the estimation of option implied spreads, which is discussed next.  
We employ two different models to estimate the 5-year option implied spreads. Firstly, we use an 
extended version of the CreditGrades model as described in Stamicar and Finger (2006). To implement 
the model we only need daily implied volatilities for 2-month equity ATM (at-the-money) put options 
which we obtain from Bloomberg. Secondly, we also implement a reduced form type model, based on the 
seminal work of Merton (1976) and developed in Hull et al. (2005). Its inputs are the 2-month ATM and 
25-delta OTM (out-the-money) equity option implied volatilities for each firm in our dataset, the 
moneyness of the options κ
 
and the recovery rate, R
. 
Daily implied volatilities are taken from 
Bloomberg. The corresponding moneyness κ of the two options can be derived by inverting the formula 
for an option’s delta and solving for κ . The results reported in the paper are based on the extended 
CreditGrades model. We use a reduced form type model to check the robustness of our results. The 
reference time for the option market is the same as for the equity market and it depends on the closing 
time of the exchange in which a specific company is traded. By comparing the reference time of the 
pricing data across the four markets it appears that the bond market may have a marginal informational 
advantage as its closing quotes are the last to be collected each day. 
Descriptive statistics of the four series of credit spreads are shown in Table 1. Average spreads across the 
four markets vary with the CDS market recording the lowest spread (101 basis points) followed by the 
bond market (123 bp) option market (161 bp) and equity market (194 bp). Upon closer inspection, the 
abnormally high spreads from the equity market appear to be due to the two car companies in our sample, 
Volkswagen and Renault. Stamicar and Finger (2006) report abnormally high equity implied spreads for 
the car companies in their sample due to the difficulty of modelling the true level of their liabilities. 
Accounting data cannot be taken at face value in these cases as they are affected by large amounts of 
secured debt issued by the firms’ financial subsidiaries. The option market implied spread is similarly 
affected by leverage. 
We expect the level of spreads obtained from the bond and CDS markets not to be perfectly aligned with 
those implied from the equity and option markets. Both equity and option implied spreads are estimated 
with CreditGrades which is based on the Merton (1974) model. The discrepancy of these spreads relative 
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to the bond and CDS markets should be expected given the well-known inaccuracy of the Merton model 
at capturing the level of market spreads (see Jones et al., 1984, Eom et al., 2004, Huang and Huang, 2003 
and Ericsson et al., 2007). However, our focus is on the changes in the credit spreads (rather than the 
levels) because these are the real determinants of the prices discovery of a given market. Then, our 
implicit assumption is that the Merton model can capture changes in credit spreads accurately which is 
confirmed by the leading role in price discovery of equity and option implied spreads in tranquil and 
crisis periods respectively as evidenced by our results8. 
In the analysis that follows we split our sample into a pre-crisis sub-sample, which starts in January 2006 
and ends in July 2007, and a crisis sub-sample that begins in August 2007 and lasts until the end of the 
observation period in July 2009. We set August 1st, 2007 as the starting time of the crisis because the cost 
of insurance against default for several companies doubled in that month. 
 
4. Methodology 
To determine which market is the “first to move”, i.e. which market anticipates the credit spread changes 
observed in or implied from the other markets, we employ a VECM specification. The first step of our 
analysis is to check for the presence of unit roots in the four series of spreads for each company. If the 
series are I(1), the second step is to analyse whether the CDS, bond, equity and option markets are linked 
via a long run equilibrium relation. The general model to describe changes in credit spreads for the four 
markets is given below:9 
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 Moreover, it has been found that a CDS-bond basis for a given company significantly different from zero during the crisis is an 
indication that CDS and bond markets were pricing credit risk differently (Bai and Collin-Dufresne, 2011). 
9
 In line with most previous studies we specify the VECM by using the original series of spreads. An alternative would be to use 
the logarithm of credit spreads like in Forte and Peña (2009). 
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where ε1t, ε2t, ε3t, ε4t  are i.i.d. error terms. The iCE  terms are cointegration equations defined as: 
1211111 −− −−= tt OISCDSCE φφ                                                                                 (5) 
1221212 −− −−= tt OISBCSCE φφ                                                                                            (6) 
1231313 −− −−= tt OISEISCE φφ ,                                                                                            (7) 
where CDS, BCS, EIS and OIS indicate CDS mid-quotes, bond credit spreads, equity implied spreads and 
option implied spreads, respectively. 
This general representation applies to the companies for which the maximum number of cointegrating 
equations (three) is found. We call this Model I. However, a restricted version of this general 
representation will apply if the number of cointegrating equations is less than three. In particular, if only 
two cointegrating equations are found, a restricted model, Model II, is employed. For companies with 
only one cointegrating equation, we define a further restricted model called Model III.   
To determine the contribution to price discovery of the various markets, one can focus on the statistical 
significance and sign of the error correction coefficients λ’s. For instance, if the option market leads the 
discovery of the price of credit risk, the λij’s in equations (1) to (3), under Model I, will be negative and 
statistically significant as all the other three markets will adjust when they deviate from the option market. 
On the other hand, if the option market is the least important in the price discovery process then all the λ’s 
in equation (4) will be positive and statistically significant as the option market adjusts when it deviates 
from the other markets. If all λij’s  in equations (1) to (3) and all the λ’s in equation (4) are significant and 
with the signs indicated above, then price discovery takes place, to some degree, in all markets. In 
general, to determine which market has a leading role in price discovery two indicators are used in the 
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literature, the information share (IS) indicator developed by Hasbrouck (1995) and the GG indicator of 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995).  
While the GG measure includes only the error correction coefficients λ’s, in the IS measure the error 
correction coefficients are weighed by the variances and covariances of the error terms in the VECM. It 
can be shown that these are linked to the variance of a latent common factor, that is the efficient market 
price of credit risk, implied by the long term cointegration relationship. Then, the information share of a 
market can be interpreted as the proportion of the variance of the common factor explained by that 
market. The higher the proportion, the closer the market to the efficient price, and the more dominant its 
role in price discovery. 
We further extend our study of the information flow across markets by analysing volatility spillovers. 
This is done through a 4-variate GARCH model which can be represented as follows: 
),0(~| 1 ttt HN−Ωε                                                                                                       (9) 
where  1 2 3 4( , , , ) 't t t t tε ε ε ε ε=  is the vector of disturbances from the VECM estimated with Model I 
through equations (1)-(7), and 1t−Ω  is the information set at time t-1. The vector tε  is assumed to be 
normally distributed. Following Baba and Inada (2009), we use a two-step procedure where the first step 
involves estimating the VECM and the second step is the application of the multivariate GARCH model 
to the VECM residuals. Our analysis is based on the BEKK specification of the GARCH model of Engle 
and Kroner (1995): 
'
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In addition to an investigation of volatility spillovers, the above model lends itself well to a further 
application. As IS is defined as a function of the volatility of the error terms in the VECM, we can 
produce a time dependent (daily) IS by replacing the unconditional error volatilities with the conditional 
volatilities obtained with (10). As a result, we can derive dynamic price discovery measures which have 
not been explored before and offer the opportunity to represent, in a clear and intuitive way, the time 
varying behaviour of the information flow among markets.     
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5. Results 
Our procedure to allocate companies to specific models starts with a unit root test on the series of credit 
spreads obtained from the four markets. We find that most of them are non-stationary at 5% level of 
significance. However, stationarity is found for Vivendi (for its equity and option implied spreads), 
Volkswagen (for its equity and option implied spreads) and Casino Guichard (for its option implied 
spreads). The results of the Johansen cointegration test for each of the 12 companies are shown in Table 
2.10 We find evidence of three cointegrating relationships for 4 companies (Basf, Lvmh, Marks&Spencer 
and Telenor). Hence, for these 4 companies, we are able to perform a price discovery analysis with the 
full model (Model I) comprising equations (1) to (7).11 For other 4 companies (Carrefour, Casino 
Guichard, Renault and Vodafone), we only find two cointegrating relationships; these companies are 
analysed with Model II. Finally, we find only one cointegrating equation for the last 4 companies (Stora 
Enso, Upm, Vivendi and Volkswagen) which are studied with Model III. 
For the companies included in Model II and Model III, we have to re-define the VECM given in equations 
(1)-(7). We notice that, for all the companies in Model II, the two cointegrating equations do not include 
the equity market. Thus, in the Model II specification of the VECM we have three markets only, namely 
the CDS, bond and option markets and cointegrating equations (5) and (6). For companies in Model III, 
we find that for Upm the cointegrating equation is (6) while for Stora Enso it is (7). For Vivendi and 
Volkswagen the only non-stationary series are the CDS and bond spreads which means that their 
cointegrating equation necessarily will include these two markets. 
Following Blanco et al. (2005), we also test restrictions on the significant cointegrating equations of the 
three models. In theory, the four markets we analyse should price credit risk equally in the long term. In 
other words, their credit spreads should be cointegrated with cointegrating vectors [0, 1] in equations (5)-
(7), which means that the coefficient of the option implied spread should equal -1 and the constant term in 
each cointegrating equation should equal zero. If this is not the case, three explanations are possible: (a) 
different markets price credit risk differently; (b) at least one market in a given cointegrating equation 
incorporates non-transient factors which are unrelated to credit risk; (c) at least one market includes non-
transient measurement errors.  
                                                          
10
 We tested for cointegration separately for the pre-crisis and in-crisis periods. The results clearly suggest that the two sub-
samples are too short for such an analysis. In the pre-crisis period 10 companies have only one cointegrating relationship, whilst 
in the in-crisis period most companies have two cointegrating relationships, and none has three cointegrating relationships. 
11
 Interestingly, Forte and Peña (2009) also find that they can perform a complete price discovery analysis for only 4 companies 
(included in their Model I) out of 17 companies in their sample.    
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Results of the test on the restrictions imposed on the cointegrating vectors are reported in Table 3. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for 3 of the 4 companies in Model I for the cointegrating vectors defined 
in equation (5) and (7) at 1% level and we never reject the null for the cointegrating vector defined in 
equation (6). For companies in Model II, we cannot reject the null, at 1% level, for 3 (out of 4) companies 
for the cointegrating vector defined in (5), whereas we have no rejection of the null for 2 companies for 
the cointegrating vector defined in (6). Instead, rejection of the null, at the 1% level, is always suggested 
for companies in Model III. Overall, except for the companies in Model III, the markets price credit risk 
equally in several cases.  
These findings are not unexpected since the option implied spreads based on the Merton model, while 
adequately tracking changes in credit quality, may not reproduce the exact level of credit spreads 
observed in the CDS and bond markets. However, since our analysis of price discovery is based on credit 
spread changes, the results reported in Table 3 are not a matter of concern. 
5.1 Price discovery analysis 
Only Model I allows us to perform a complete analysis of price discovery across the four markets. A price 
discovery analysis in Model II can be performed only for CDS, bond and options. The analysis for the 
companies studied with Model III will be restricted to the two markets included in the only cointegrating 
equation considered.  
The main results of this paper are based on the implementation of Model I. The estimates of the error 
correction coefficients (λ’s) are shown in Table 4. Coefficients can be looked at in pairs for a preliminary 
assessment of price discovery. For example, λ11 and λ41 give an indication of the relationship between the 
option and CDS markets. In particular, if λ11 is negative and significant and λ41 insignificant, then the 
option market leads the CDS market. Similarly, if we are interested in the leading role between the bond 
and option markets or the equity and option markets, we should focus on λ22 and λ42 or λ33 and λ43 
respectively. We observe that before the crisis period, the long term inter-linkages among the markets are 
weaker as the number of statistically significant error correction coefficients decreases as compared to the 
crisis period. Overall, the analysis of the VECM estimates clearly shows a more dominant role of the 
option market over the other markets and this is especially true during the crisis period. To determine the 
extent of the price discovery that takes place in each market relative to the others we employ the 
information share (IS) indicator of Hasbrouck (1995) and the GG measure of Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995). Table 5 shows the IS mid-point and GG estimates for the companies analysed with Model I. Panel 
A of Table 5 reports the results for the whole sample. As in previous studies (see, for instance, Baillie et 
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al., 2002 and Forte and Peña, 2009), we shall consider the IS mid-point to draw our conclusions12. The IS 
indicates that 44% of price discovery occurs in the option market, 27% in the bond market, 23% in the 
CDS market, and 10% in the equity market.  
But, when looking at the two sub-samples, the price discovery measures vary considerably. Before the 
crisis, the IS indicates that 40% of price discovery takes place in the equity market, 34% in the option 
market, 21% in the CDS market, and very little, only 6% in the bond market. During the financial crisis, 
the IS measure in the equity market dramatically reduces to 10%, in the option market it increases to 47%, 
in the CDS market it stays constant at 21%, while in the bond market it increases markedly to 27%. It is 
apparent that the findings for the whole sample are mainly driven by the crisis period. The most striking 
result is the role of the option market both before and during the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, it 
contributes substantially to the price discovery of credit risk although not as much as the equity market. 
On the other hand, during the crisis period, according to the IS measure, the option market dominates 
price discovery while the equity market is the least important. Interestingly, the bond market is the least 
important before the crisis while it becomes the second most prominent one during the financial crisis.  
One possible explanation for the dominance of the option market in crisis periods is the proliferation of 
trading strategies which attempt to exploit the higher levels of volatility in the markets. Most of these 
strategies are based on the use of options (see Neftci, 2008 and Hedge Funds Review, 2006). When 
uncertainty in the market is high, market participants are less willing to take on directional bets and then 
prefer to trade volatility. Hence, they either seek to buy insurance to protect their positions against 
adverse movement in prices (hedgers) or try to profit from large fluctuations, either positive or negative, 
which are usually observed in these scenarios (speculators). Both types of investors can achieve their aims 
by leveraging up positions in options. 
The other finding of our analysis refers to the increasing role of the bond market in price discovery during 
the crisis. This may be related to the liquidity problems - faced by market participants during the recent 
financial crisis, as they were forced to deleverage their corporate bond positions to re-pay their short term 
exposures, as discussed in Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).  
The dramatic fall in the price discovery of the equity market during the crisis may be due to a substantial 
increase in hedging costs. Das and Hanouna (2009) show that equity hedging costs increase when markets 
are volatile. When stock prices fall, hedge ratios rise, thus determining an increase in hedging costs, 
worsened by the presence of frictions such as illiquidity in the equity market. This could be a reason why, 
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 To save space, we do not report the upper and lower bounds of the IS measure. However, their range is narrow which suggests 
that the reported midpoint is a reasonable estimate of the price discovery in each market.  
14 
 
under such circumstances, professional investors may channel their trades via different trading venues 
such as bond and option markets. In fact, if an investor wants to hedge his short CDS position, he may 
buy put options or short the underlying reference bonds, in addition to selling equity. 
A second possible reason for the lesser role of the equity market relative to the other markets during the 
crisis may be related to the presence of informed trading and insider trading documented for the 
derivatives markets by Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Acharya and Johnson (2007). In particular, the 
former study focuses on the option market and documents how information on option trading volumes 
could help predict the future movements of equity prices, which supports the greater importance of 
options in the price formation process. The latter study highlights how insider trading could be the reason 
of the superiority of the CDS market over the equity market in terms of information revelation in presence 
of negative credit news. 
The two measures of price discovery give consistent results in the pre-crisis analysis. This is not the case, 
in some instances, for the crisis period. In particular, during the crisis, the option market appears to be 
leading the price discovery according to the IS measure, whereas it shows a low GG value (10%). The 
study of Yan and Zivot (2007) sheds light on this occasional lack of consistency and it recommends that 
GG and IS can be used in combination to disentangle transitory and permanent effects, but that only IS is 
an indicator of “the relative informativeness of individual markets”. They argue that a high IS combined 
with a low GG measure for a given market is likely to suggest that the price discovery role of that market 
is dominant because it responds mainly to fundamental shocks rather than transitory shocks. According to 
Hasbrouck (1995), the IS of a market is the proportion of variance in the efficient price that is attributable 
to innovations in that market. Hence, the higher variances of a given market can generate a much higher 
IS13. A further explanation is offered by Baillie et al. (2002), who showed that when the correlation 
between the VECM innovations is very large and/or their variances are unequal, the two measures can 
give very different results. In our case, the VECM residuals are not highly correlated (the highest 
correlation being about 0.25), but the variance of the innovations for the option market is higher than in 
the other markets, and this is the reason for the discrepancy between the two measures of price discovery 
during the crisis period.  
Our evidence of the alternating dominant roles of the stock and option markets is consistent with the 
findings of Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who show that option implied volatilities are the main 
determinant of CDS price changes in high volatility regimes while equity market returns are the leading 
                                                          
13
 There has been a lively debate on the correct interpretation of the GG and IS measures. Generally, the IS measure seems to be 
the proper measure to assess the amount of information generated by each market. For more on this topic, see the special issue 
(issue 3, 2002) of the Journal of Financial Markets.  
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determinant during stable markets. The dominant role of the equity market during stable periods is also in 
line with the results of Forte and Peña (2009) and Norden and Weber (2009). Our findings support those 
of Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) and Cao et al. (2010), who document the importance of the information 
flow from the option market to the CDS and equity markets. Finally, as in Zhu (2004) and Blanco et al. 
(2005), we observe that in the pre-crisis period the bond market is dominated by the CDS market in terms 
of price discovery. However, the opposite is true during the crisis as both price discovery measures 
attribute a substantial price discovery role to the bond market. The increasing importance of price 
discovery in the bond market during the recent financial crisis is also documented by Bai and Collin-
Dufresne (2011), who look at a sample of US companies.  
The analysis of Model II gives further support to the results obtained above. For this model we directly 
report the IS and GG measures in Table 6. We can see that, in the pre-crisis period, the IS measure 
indicates that 18% of price discovery takes place in the option market, 31% in the bond market, 53% in 
the CDS market. During the crisis, the IS increases to 69% in the option market, decreases to 20% in the 
bond market, and decreases to 12% in the CDS market.  
In Model III (results reported in Table 7) we have one cointegrating relationship and only two markets are 
considered. The restrictions in the analysis caused by the exclusion of two of the four markets and the fact 
that the restrictions on the cointegrating vector are rejected at the 1% level (as shown in Table 3) imply 
that the Model III findings should be taken with caution. For Upm, our estimates show that the bond 
market has a dominant role over the option market (according to both GG and IS) in both pre-crisis and 
crisis periods but less so in the latter. For Stora Enso we find that the option market has a leading role 
over equity in the pre-crisis period with a IS measure of 62% but it is dominated in the crisis period. For 
Vivendi and Volkswagen, where the only cointegrated markets are CDSs and bonds, the bond market 
leads the CDS market both before and during the crisis14. 
5.2 Volatility spillovers across CDS, bond, equity and option spreads 
In order to detect volatility spillovers between the four markets, we focus on the significance of the off-
diagonal elements defined in matrices A  and B in equation (10). For instance, if we are interested in 
measuring volatility spillovers from the option market to the CDS market, we will have to look at the 
significance of 41a  and 41b , where 41a  measures innovation spillovers in terms of squared residuals and 
41b  measures volatility spillovers in terms of conditional variance. Table 8 reports the frequency with 
                                                          
14
 For Models II and III, we also analysed the short-term price discovery patterns from VARs based on changes in the spreads 
(excluding the error correction terms). Results, in general, confirm the leading role of the option market in the crisis period and 
are available from the authors on request. 
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which spillover parameters are statistically significant for the companies included in Model I. If we focus 
on frequencies equal to or greater than 75%, we can clearly see how volatility spillovers are more 
frequent from the option market to the other markets during the crisis period. However, before the crisis, 
the option market is less responsible for volatility spillovers towards the other markets, whereas the 
frequency of significant spillovers from the CDS to the equity market is substantial (with a frequency of 
75%).   
5.3 GARCH models: a new application for price discovery 
As discussed towards the end of the Methodology section we propose a new way to generate time-varying 
IS measures based on a GARCH specification of the error terms in our VECM. In Figure 1, we show our 
daily IS measures for Marks&Spencer over the whole sample. The results highlight the usefulness of 
point-in-time estimates of price discovery as it allows us to capture a greater variety of patterns than an 
analysis based on a simple split of the sample into two sub-periods. Indeed, the period preceding the crisis 
is mainly characterised by the dominant role of the equity market in line with the price discovery results 
discussed in Section 5.1. However, we can see that in the first part of the crisis period the equity market 
still plays the leading role in price discovery until June 23, 2008. Then, in the heat of the crisis, 
immediately before and after the default of Lehman Brothers, the option market takes a clear lead. 
Finally, from the second quarter of 2009, when the crisis subsides and stock markets start to recover, the 
equity market bounces back to its pre-crisis dominant role.  
 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1 Alternative model for options data 
In the analysis we have used option implied spreads obtained from CreditGrades, a structural credit risk 
model. As a robustness test, we redo our calculations with a reduced form model based on Merton (1976) 
and discussed in Hull et al. (2005). Details are shown in Appendix B. The alternative model uses two 
option implied volatilities as the only inputs to derive option implied spreads, and no accounting data. Its 
main disadvantage is that the resulting implied spreads often overestimate market spreads. However, in 
our analysis we focus on credit spread changes rather than levels, so the higher level of the spreads should 
not be a problem. In addition, in the cointegrating equations, where levels are used, the constant term can 
capture differences in levels between the implied and observed spreads.  
We implement the reduced form model for companies in Model I only. Again, the IS and GG measures 
are calculated for the whole sample, the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Our (unreported) results confirm 
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the dominance of the equity market in the period preceding the financial crisis, followed by the CDS and 
the bond market15. However, during the crisis period, the option market is more important than both the 
CDS and equity markets, the latter showing the least role in price discovery, in line with our results from 
section 5. Repeating our analysis of spillover effects with the new series of option implied spreads 
estimated with the reduced form model, the results are very similar to those shown in Section 5.2.  
6.2 Three variable model and comparison with previous studies  
Previous studies have analysed credit risk price discovery only in three or fewer markets. For instance, 
Forte and Peña (2009) and Norden and Weber (2009) investigated the comovements of CDS, bond and 
equity markets. It would be interesting to see how our framework applied to the above three markets 
compares with previous findings. We repeat our analysis for all the companies with the maximum number 
of cointegrating equations (Model I), but based only on the CDS, bond and equity markets. Consistent 
with Forte and Peña (2009) and Norden and Weber (2009), we find that, in stable periods, the equity 
market has the dominant role in price discovery, followed by the CDS market and the bond market, which 
confirms that our findings are not sample specific. Interestingly, during the crisis (which was not 
investigated in previous contributions) it is the bond market that dominates in the three market analysis. 
However, as shown in previous sections, the true role of these three markets in credit risk price discovery 
can be properly assessed only when the option market is included in the analysis. In Table 9 we compare 
the 3- and 4-market price discovery measures. It can be clearly seen that the role of the CDS market 
remains mostly unchanged when the option market is included. On the other hand, the IS measure of the 
bond and equity markets drop by 14% and 13% respectively in the pre-crisis period. During the crisis 
period, the fall is even more pronounced at 19% and 21% respectively. An analysis of the behaviour of 
the GG measure leads to similar conclusions.  The above shows that the exclusion of the option market 
from the analysis leads to an overestimation of the contribution to price discovery of bonds and equities. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses price discovery and volatility spillovers in credit spreads obtained or implied from the 
option, CDS, bond and equity markets. Our main finding is that the option market leads the price 
discovery during periods of market turmoil while it is less important but still relevant in tranquil periods. 
In line with recent studies, the equity market represents the main venue for credit risk price discovery 
under stable market conditions. However, we find that it has a minor role in periods of high volatility. A 
new finding relates to the bond market which, while being the less relevant in stable periods, acquires a 
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 Results are available on request. 
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major role during crisis periods, contributing more to price discovery than the CDS and the equity 
markets. The CDS market is important in both stable and turbulent conditions, but its role is not 
predominant. Consistent with the price discovery results, the relevance of the option market in crisis 
periods is clear even when we investigate volatility spillovers across markets. Robustness tests confirm 
our findings and, more importantly, show that previous studies that ignore the option market may 
misrepresent the price discovery process. Finally, we introduce a time-varying measure of price discovery 
based on a multivariate GARCH model. This measure highlights the variability of the information flow 
across markets and confirms its high sensitivity to changing market conditions.  
 
Appendix A  
CreditGrades Model 
According to the model, the recovery rate L  follows a lognormal distribution with mean L  and standard 
deviation λ where 
ELL = and                                                                                                                          (A1) 
)log(2 LVar=λ , such that                                                                                                      (A2)   
2/2λλ −
=
ZDeLLD ,                                                                                                           (A3)    
Z is a standard normal random variable which is known at the time of default only. The company’s asset 
value is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion: 
t
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                                                                                                                (A4) 
where µ  is the asset drift, σ  is the asset volatility and W  is a standard Brownian motion. 
The survival probability of the company at any time t is given by the probability that the asset value (A4) 
does not hit the barrier defined in (A3) before time t: 
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The asset value and asset volatility can be proxied by market observables parameters. In fact, it can be 
assumed that at time t = 0: 
DLSV +=  and                                                                                                               (A8) 
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such that (A6) and (A7) can be transformed as: 
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where S  is the stock price, Sσ  is the stock volatility, D  is the debt-per-share, L  is the global recovery 
rate and λ  is the percentage standard deviation of the default barrier. Finally, the survival probability is 
converted to a credit spread as follows: 
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and, following Rubinstein and Reiner (1991),  
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In particular, an estimate of the asset volatility can be obtained by using the following relationship16: 
(1 )
rt
S
LDe
S
σ σ= +                                                                                                           (A16) 
where Sσ  is a daily time series of ATM equity option implied volatilities. By inverting the formula and 
solving for the unknown asset volatility σ , we can calculate an option-implied spread (OIS) by using 
again equation (A12).  
Appendix B 
The reduced form model is based on the seminal work of Merton (1976), where the stock price is allowed 
to follow a jump-diffusion process: 
dqdzdtk
S
dS
E ++−= σθµ )(                                                                                             (B1) 
where dq  is a Poisson process with intensity θ  and jump size k . 
Hull et al. (2005) assume that, in presence of jumps, the stock price goes always to zero. This, in turn, 
implies that the company has defaulted. Hence, defaults are assumed to follow a Poisson process with 
intensity θ  in the same fashion as reduced form models (see Duffie and Singleton (1999), among others). 
Reduced form models are traditionally calibrated on bond data. However, the model used in this paper 
and detailed in Hull et al. (2005) is calibrated on option data. According to Merton (1976), the price of a 
put option with strike price K  and maturity τ  is given by: 
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and κ represents the moneyness of the option: 
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 See Stamicar and Finger (2006) for a comprehensive discussion on different ways to extend the original CreditGrades model. 
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0S  being the current stock price and r  the risk-free interest rate. 
Equating (B2) to the Black-Scholes price of a put option, we obtain: 
)()()()()( ** 1212 1 ddedde −−−=−+−−− −− φκφκφφκ θτθτ                                                (B5) 
where τ
τ
κ
v
v
d 5.0)log(*1 +
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= and τvdd −= *1
*
2                                                         (B6) 
with v  defining the implied volatility. 
Finally, the credit spread on the debt (in the case of a zero coupon bond) can be recovered using: 
( )[ ] TReeOIS TT θθ −+−= − 1log
    
                                                                                     (B7) 
As we have two equations in the form of (B5) for each implied volatility and two unknowns (namely, θ
and Eσ ), the optimisation problem generates two unique solutions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are provided for four series of credit spreads: CDS, bond, equity and option spreadsover the period January 2006 - July 2009. The rating column 
indicates the lowest and the highest rating assigned to each company by Moody’s during the whole sample period. Only one rating is reported when a company’s rating did 
not change.  
 
 
 Moody’s CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
 Obs. Rating  Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD 
Basf 396 A1-Aa3 8.5 160 35.5 29.9 0.1 157.2 21.7 29.5 0 1480.5 50.8 152.7 0 1002 34.1 103.4 
Carrefour 768 A3-A2 10.5 147.5 39.7 26.6 0.2 582 63.2 84.8 0 865.7 80 173.8 0.1 1046 76.6 155.5 
Casino Guich. 832 Baa3 37.5 430 110.4 64.2 47.2 748.6 160.1 125.1 0.2 1200.6 112.6 216.3 13.1 811.3 100.7 117.1 
Lvmh 741 Baa2-Baa1 12.5 222.5 55.4 43.8 7.6 270 60.3 54.1 0 884 67 164.5 0 951.4 47.8 129.7 
Marks&Spencer 845 Baa1 25.5 560 133.1 124.3 36.5 651.8 171.6 163.4 0 1395.4 173.1 285 0 1296.3 138.8 231 
Renault 527 Baa1-Baa2 17 580 126.7 137.9 22.6 816.1 156.4 188 17.8 2382.3 413.6 579.2 28.3 2558.9 411.9 570.7 
StoraEnso 518 Ba2-Baa3 29.5 762.5 241.9 214.1 38.4 812.5 270.4 268.9 0.5 1392.3 264.5 362.5 1.5 1466.6 231.2 306.4 
Telenor 539 A3-A2 15.5 180 47.6 34.3 18.8 365.3 62.4 70.1 0.1 2011.6 84.5 297.1 1 1186.2 60.9 177.2 
Upm 482 Baa2-Baa3 28.5 500 188.8 160.8 36.7 799.5 239.5 248.2 0.1 971.1 218.5 299.8 1.2 1231.2 169.4 236.3 
Vivendi 776 Baa2 32.5 275 84.8 47.2 41.5 388.3 117.7 87.2 0 590.2 24.4 93.7 0 780 27.4 89.2 
Vodafone 800 A3-Baa1 20.5 217.5 67.5 49.4 21.1 328.6 69.2 59.6 0 828.7 77.4 146.6 0.1 1758.6 75.9 188.8 
Volkswagen 651 A3 13.5 412.5 80.3 79.7 16.9 476.7 84.1 102.3 13.8 14769 757.6 2585 32.3 16524 552.1 1186 
                   
Mean   21.0 370.6 101.0 84.4 24.0 533.1 123.1 123.4 2.7 2397.6 193.7 446.4 6.5 2551.0 160.6 290.9 
St. dev.   9.5 200.1 63.3 60.8 16.1 232.9 77.5 77.6 6.2 3930.0 209.4 685.9 11.7 4427.3 164.1 310.4 
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Table 2. Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Johansen Trace test statistics are reported for the system of four non-stationary series of credit spreads obtained 
from the CDS, bond, equity and option markets. The test specification includes a constant in both the 
cointegration equation and the VAR. The optimal number of lags is chosen according to the Akaike criterion. 
Columns 2 to 5 show test statistics for a given maximum number of cointegration relations. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 None At Most 1 At Most 2 At Most 3 
Basf 179.23*** 82.58*** 28.68*** 1.77 
Carrefour 168.24*** 29.80** 10.84 4.32** 
Casino Guich. 123.11*** 27.01*** 2.66 - 
Lvmh 198.50*** 69.20*** 28.25*** 3.40* 
Marks&Spencer 165.58*** 49.78*** 16.56** 1.87 
Renault 202.56*** 67.49*** 12.26 1.24 
StoraEnso 84.20*** 24.02 8.46 1.54 
Telenor 202.30*** 67.42*** 22.06*** 0.80 
Upm 82.40*** 24.70 6.67 1.01 
Vivendi 14.47* 0.39 - - 
Vodafone 153.33*** 28.22* 7.51 1.63 
Volkswagen 29.44*** 3.22* - - 
 
 
Table 3. Tests on the Equivalence of Credit Spreads Across Markets 
This table reports statistical tests on the equivalence of credit spreads across markets for the individual 
companies in our sample. For companies in Model I, CE1, CE2 and CE3 correspond to cointegrating equations 
(5), (6) and (7), respectively. For companies in Model II, CE1 and CE2 correspond to cointegrating equations 
(5) and (6), respectively. For companies in Model III, CE1 corresponds to cointegrating equation (6) and 
equation (7) for Upm and Stora Enso, respectively. For Vivendi and Volkswagen CE1=CDSt-1-ф11-ф21BCSt-1. 
We test the null hypothesis that the difference between the credit spreads identified by the above cointegrating 
equations is zero. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.    
 
 Restriction on CE1 Restriction on CE2 Restriction on CE3 
 [1, -1, 0]  [1, -1, 0]    [1, -1, 0]  
Basf 0.56  3.62*  6.58**  
Lvmh 2.57  0.11  8.02***  
Marks&Spencer 7.33***  0.02  0.11  
Telenor 0.74  2.22  0.003  
Carrefour 4.09**  3.83*  -  
Casino Guich. 1.19  8.00***  -  
Renault 9.87***  10.06***  -  
Vodafone 2.08  2.17  -  
Upm 9.85***  -  -  
Stora Enso 16.44***  -  -  
Vivendi 11.79***  -  -  
Volkswagen 11.91***  -  -  
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Table 4. Error correction coefficients in Model I 
 
Error correction coefficients for the cointegration equations specified in Model I are shown for the whole sample, the pre-crisis period (January 2006 - July 2007) and the 
crisis period (August 2007 - July 2009). The number of lags to include in the VECM estimation for changes in CDS spreads, bond spreads (BCS), equity spreads (EIS) and 
option spreads (OIS) has been selected according to the Akaike criterion for the whole sample case. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 ∆CDS ∆BCS ∆EIS ∆OIS 
 λ11 λ12 λ13 λ21 λ22 λ23 λ31 λ32 λ33 λ41 λ42 λ43 
 Panel A: Whole Sample 
Basf -0.035** 0.035 -0.008 0.081*** -0.094*** -0.044*** -0.231* 1.100*** -0.279*** 0.075 0.738** 0.015 
Lvmh -0.048*** 0.005 0.005 0.042*** -0.018** -0.016*** -0.059* 0.055*** -0.039*** -0.227*** 0.199*** 0.095*** 
Marks&Spencer -0.065*** 0.042*** 0.004* 0.025*** -0.042*** -0.003** 0.006 0.011 -0.030*** 0.009 0.086** 0.024*** 
Telenor -0.071*** 0.051*** -0.001 0.073*** -0.074*** -0.011*** -0.127 -0.002 -0.159*** -0.797*** 0.765*** 0.058*** 
 Panel B: Pre-crisis period 
Basf -0.046* 0.019 0.211* 0.002 -0.114** -0.021 0.005 0.001 0.058* -0.021 -0.011 0.509*** 
Lvmh -0.006 -0.014 0.007 0.077*** -0.066*** 0.079*** 0.007 -0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Marks&Spencer 0.042* -0.070*** -0.374 0.040*** -0.042*** -0.587* 0.000 -0.001 -0.027* 0.004 0.002 0.360*** 
Telenor -0.016 -0.008 -0.005 0.008 -0.046*** -0.004 0.002 0.031 -0.021 0.029 0.039 0.018*** 
 Panel C: In-crisis period 
Basf -0.037* 0.035 -0.008 0.084*** -0.095*** -0.044*** -0.220 1.121*** -0.283*** 0.103 0.749* 0.011 
Lvmh -0.067*** 0.012 0.009* 0.114*** -0.072*** -0.028*** -0.062 0.065** -0.043*** -0.227** 0.205*** 0.083*** 
Marks&Spencer -0.067*** 0.043*** 0.004 0.023** -0.041*** -0.003* 0.003 0.013 -0.031** 0.021 0.083 0.026** 
Telenor -0.089*** 0.065** -0.001 0.100*** -0.095*** -0.012*** -0.160 -0.021 -0.162*** -1.103*** 1.021*** 0.066** 
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Table 5. Price discovery measures for Model I 
 
Information share (IS) and Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measures of price discovery for Model I are shown for the whole sample (Panel A), the pre-crisis period (January 2006 - 
July 2007, Panel B) and the in-crisis period (August 2007 - July 2009, Panel C). Mean (0-1) shows the mean value of the GG measure for CDSs, bonds, equities and options 
by restricting its values between 0 and 1 as suggested by Blanco et al. (2005). Signif. Mean is the mean GG measure calculated by attributing a value of zero to the individual 
GG values if they are not significant at the 5% level. For GG estimates:  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 IS (Midpoint) GG 
 CDSs Bonds Equities Options CDSs Bonds Equities Options 
 Panel A: Whole Sample 
Basf 0.61 0.06 0.12 0.34 0.82*** 0.17 -0.05** 0.05*** 
Lvmh 0.11 0.38 0.04 0.47 0.34 0.49*** 0.03 0.15*** 
Marks&Spencer 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.47 0.24 0.54*** 0.09 0.13*** 
Telenor 0.02 0.47 0.04 0.47 0.05 0.90*** -0.03* 0.08*** 
Mean (0-1) 0.23 0.27 0.10 0.44 0.36 0.53 0.01 0.10 
Signif. Mean      0.21 0.48 0.00 0.10 
 Panel B: Pre-crisis 
Basf 0.28 0.08 0.54 0.09 0.18** 0.06** 0.94** -0.18* 
Lvmh 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.83 0.00 -0.05 0.00 1.04** 
Marks&Spencer 0.02 0.04 0.86 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.96** 0.05 
Telenor 0.52 0.05 0.08 0.34 0.54** 0.15 0.06* 0.25** 
Mean (0-1) 0.21 0.06 0.40 0.34 0.18 0.05 0.49 0.33 
Signif. Mean      0.18 0.01 0.47 0.31 
 Panel C: In-crisis 
Basf 0.59 0.06 0.13 0.35 0.82*** 0.17* -0.05** 0.05*** 
Lvmh 0.06 0.35 0.02 0.57 0.32* 0.50*** 0.03* 0.15*** 
Marks&Spencer 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.48 0.23* 0.55** 0.09* 0.13*** 
Telenor 0.02 0.47 0.05 0.46 0.09 0.87*** -0.03 0.08*** 
Mean (0-1) 0.21 0.27 0.10 0.47 0.37 0.52 0.03 0.10 
Signif. Mean      0.21 0.48 0.00 0.10 
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Table 6. Price discovery measures for Model II 
Price discovery measures for Model II. Information share (IS) midpoint and Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measures of price discovery for CDS, bond spreads and option spreads 
are shown for the whole sample (panel A), the pre-crisis period from January 2006 to July 2007 (panel B) and the in-crisis period from August 2007 to July 2009 (panel C). 
Mean (0-1) shows the mean value of the GG measure for CDSs, bonds and options by restricting its values between 0 and 1 as suggested by Blanco et al. (2005). Signif. 
Mean is the mean GG measure calculated by attributing a value of zero to the individual GG values if they are not significant at the 5% level. For GG estimates: *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 IS (Midpoint) GG 
 CDSs Bonds Options CDSs Bonds Options 
 Panel A: Whole Sample 
Carrefour 0.15 0.01 0.85 0.75 -0.06 0.32*** 
Casino Guich. 0.17 0.14 0.70 0.30 0.42*** 0.28*** 
Renault 0.05 0.01 0.95 -0.16 0.36 0.80*** 
Vodafone 0.12 0.63 0.25 0.39 0.55*** 0.05*** 
Mean (0-1) 0.12 0.20 0.69 0.38 0.30 0.36 
Signif. Mean    0.00 0.24 0.36 
 Panel B: Pre-crisis 
Carrefour 0.36 0.43 0.21 -0.52** 0.77** 0.74** 
Casino Guich. 0.09 0.54 0.43 -0.13* 0.74** 0.39** 
Renault  0.65 0.25 0.09 3.18*** -2.36*** 0.18 
Vodafone 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.03*** -0.03 0.00 
Mean (0-1) 0.53 0.31 0.18 0.50 0.38 0.33 
Signif. Mean    0.50 0.38 0.28 
 Panel C: In-crisis 
Carrefour 0.16 0.01 0.84 0.78* -0.09* 0.31*** 
Casino Guich. 0.17 0.13 0.71 0.30* 0.42*** 0.28*** 
Renault 0.04 0.01 0.96 -0.34 0.44 0.89*** 
Vodafone 0.11 0.65 0.25 0.38 0.57*** 0.05*** 
Mean (0-1) 0.12 0.20 0.69 0.37 0.36 0.38 
Signif. Mean    0.00 0.25 0.38 
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Table 7. Price discovery measures for Model III 
The table shows the information share (IS) and Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measures of price discovery for Model III companies for the whole sample, the pre-crisis period 
(January 2006 - July 2007) and the in-crisis period (August 2007 - July 2009). Model III (a) includes the bond and option markets only, Model III (b) the equity and option 
markets only and Model III (c) the CDS and bond markets only.  
 
  IS (Midpoint) GG 
  Model  III (a) 
  Bonds Options Bonds Options 
Upm Whole Sample 0.71 0.29 0.74 0.26 
 Pre-crisis 0.98 0.02 1.09 -0.09 
 In-crisis 0.7 0.30 0.74 0.26 
  Model  III (b) 
  Equities Options Equities Options 
Stora Enso Whole Sample 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 
 Pre-crisis 0.38 0.62 0.37 0.63 
 In-crisis 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 
  Model  III (c) 
  CDSs Bonds CDSs Bonds 
 Vivendi  Whole Sample 0.64 0.36 0.49 0.51 
 Pre-crisis 0.24 0.76 0.27 0.73 
 In-crisis 0.35 
 
0.65 0.34 0.66 
Volkswagen Whole Sample 0.33 0.67 0.26 0.74 
 Pre-crisis 0.03 0.97 -0.37 1.37 
 In-crisis 0.31 0.69 0.24 0.76 
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Table 8. Volatility spillovers 
 
The table shows the frequency of significant (at the 5% level) volatility spillover parameters (a and b in equation 10) across CDS spreads, bond spreads, equity spreads and 
option spreads for companies in Model I based on a multivariate GARCH model. Results are reported for the whole sample, the pre-crisis period (January 2006 - July 2007) 
and the in-crisis period (August 2007 - July 2009). 
 
 
CDS to 
Bond 
CDS to 
Equity 
CDS to 
Option 
Bond to 
CDS 
Bond to 
Equity 
Bond to 
Option 
Equity to 
CDS 
Equity to 
Bond 
Equity to  
Option 
Option to 
CDS 
Option to 
Bond 
Option to  
Equity 
 Innovation spillovers (a) 
 
a12 a13 a14 a21 a23 a24 a31 a32 a34 a41 a42 a43 
Whole Sample 50% 0% 0% 50% 25% 0% 25% 50% 0% 50% 50% 50% 
Pre-crisis 50% 75% 25% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 50% 
In-crisis 25% 50% 0% 25% 50% 0% 50% 50% 0% 50% 50% 25% 
 Volatility spillovers (b) 
 
b12 b13 b14 b21 b23 b24 b31 b32 b34 b41 b42 b43 
Whole Sample 25% 75% 50% 50% 50% 50% 100% 75% 50% 75% 100% 75% 
Pre-crisis 25% 75% 0% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 50% 
In-crisis 25% 50% 0% 0% 25% 0% 25% 50% 25% 75% 75% 100% 
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Table 9. Price discovery measures with and without the option market 
 
This table reports the proportion of price discovery - as defined by the information share (IS) midpoint and mean Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measures - that takes place in the 
CDS, bond, equity markets in the absence of the option market and when it is included in the VECM specification (equations 1 to 4). Results are shown for the whole sample 
(panel A), the pre-crisis period (January 2006 - July 2007, panel B) and the in-crisis period (August 2007 - July 2009, panel C). 
 
 IS Midpoint GG 
 CDS Bond Equity Option CDS Bond Equity Option 
 Panel A: Whole Sample 
Without options 23% 47% 35% - 34% 57% 10% - 
With options 23% 27% 10% 44% 36% 53% 1% 10% 
Difference  0% -20% -25% 44% 2% -4% -7% 10% 
 Panel B: Pre-crisis period 
Without options 27% 20% 53% - 21% 11% 69% - 
With options 21% 6% 40% 34% 18% 5% 49% 33% 
Difference  -6% -14% -13% 34% -3% -6% -20% 33% 
 Panel C: In-crisis period 
Without options 25% 46% 31% - 35% 57% 10% - 
With options 21% 27% 10% 47% 37% 52% 3% 10% 
Difference  -4% -19% -21% 47% 2% -5% -7% 10% 
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Figure 1. Time-varying price discovery measure for Marks and Spencer 
 
The Figures show the daily midpoint of the information share (IS) for the equity and option markets (upper panel) and the CDS and bond markets (lower panel) for 
Marks&Spencer.  
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